Countries restrict the export of natural resources to lower domestic prices, stimulate downstream industries, earn rents on international markets, or on environmental grounds. This paper provides empirical evidence of evasion of such export barriers. Using tools from the illicit trade literature, I show that exports of minerals, metals, or wood products are more likely to be missing from the exporter's statistics if they face export barriers such as prohibitions or taxes. Furthermore, I show that this relationship is significantly higher in countries with high levels of corruption and bribes at customs. The results have implications for the design of trade policies and environmental protection.
Introduction
Trade in natural resources is highly regulated, mostly on the export side. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2010) , about one-third of all export taxes cover natural resource sectors. Countries restrict the export of natural resources to lower domestic prices, promote downstream industries, earn rents on international markets, or on environmental grounds. For example China recently restricted the export of rare earth metals, the US has been restricting oil and gas exports, and Nigeria bans the export of timber.
1 In this paper I
show that the illegal avoidance of such barriers is rife and leaves traces in official statistics.
To do so, I follow the literature on tariff evasion (e.g. Fisman and Wei (2004) ) and show that the trade gap, i.e. the log difference between imports and mirror exports, is significantly correlated with export barriers. To put it simply, exports are more likely to be missing from the exporter's official statistics when export barriers are in place, suggesting part of missing exports are illegal, having circumvented export barriers.
My results suggest that the trade gap is as much as 87% larger for products facing export taxes. In other words, illegal exports may amount to as much as 87% of legal exports and are thus almost as important as legal exports when taxes are in place. The biggest effect by far is found for export prohibitions; the trade gap is around 12 times larger for prohibited exports than for all other products. In the case of prohibition, practically all recorded imports may reflect illegal exports. These effects are strongest in countries facing corruption problems where bribes may hinder barrier enforcement. Interestingly, I do not find a significant effect for export license requirements. This may point to export licenses as the most adequate tool to fight evasion on restricted exports.
This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, while the trade and environmental consequences of export restrictions have been studied for a long time (e.g. Dean and Gangopadhyay (1997) , Fung and Korinek (2013) , and Korinek and Kim 1 For a review of recent trends in export restrictions, see Kim (2010) .
(2010)), this paper is the first to look empirically at their impact on illegal behavior. 2 As the WTO (2010) puts it, natural resources present particular challenges for policymakers, in part because they are both essential to the production process and potentially exhaustible.
Designing efficient trade polices is thus of upmost importance. This paper highlights that attention also needs to be given to the unintended consequences of such polices. Second, I add to the previous illicit-trade studies by Fisman and Wei (2004) , Javorcik and Narciso (2008), and Mishra et al. (2008) , by bringing attention to export barriers rather than import tariffs.
3
The next section (2) describes the data and my empirical strategy. Section (3) discusses the results. A last section (4) concludes.
Data and Empirical Strategy
I use data on export restrictions collected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and covering 51 countries in the years (Fliess and Mard, 2012 . It covers most minerals and metals, as well as wood products, in their unprocessed as well as in their semi-processed form. Waste and scrap metal is also included.
Commodities covered belong mainly to [44] [45] [46] [71] [72] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] in 2010) concern waste and scrap of metal. This is followed by metal ores and minerals, precious metals and stones, and ferrous metals. The intensity of export barriers by country is displayed in Figure 1 . China, India, South Africa, and Argentina appear as the biggest users of such barriers.
The export barriers may be export taxes, VAT tax reductions, export quotas, export For this reason, 'missing exports' may not be used to quantify illegal exports precisely.
Nevertheless, as Fisman and Wei (2004) argue, 'missing trade' still allows us to identify correlation patterns and uncover the causes of illicit flows. In the absence of illegal behavior, there should be no correlation between export barriers and the trade gap. yet if trade gaps are significantly higher for exports facing trade barriers, it is highly likely that missing exports include illegal exports that have circumvented customs. In other words, the difference in trade gaps between exports facing barriers and other exports most likely captures illegal exports. In Figure 2 I plot the density estimates of missing exports for both products facing export barriers and those that do not. The distribution of missing exports for products facing a barrier is slightly to the right of the other, suggesting there are more missing exports when export barriers are in place.
To test for illegal evasion of export barriers hypothesis statistically, I thus estimate the following regression model:
where 'Barrier' is a dummy indicating an export barrier, k stands for the type of export barrier, i stands for product defined at the HS 6-digit level, j for exporting country, t for year, and n for industry, defined at the HS 2-digit level. I choose to include industry-country-year fixed effects, i.e. α njt , to account for country-, year-, or industry-specific attributes that could be driving the relationship between barriers and trade gaps. The identifying variation is thus the most precise across-products as possible, i.e. within country-industry-year. 
Results
The benchmark results are in Table 2 . Whether I take missing exports in dollars or kilograms, I find a positive and significant coefficient on the export-barrier dummy, the prohibition dummy, and the export tax dummy. These suggest that the trade gap is between 36% and 50% larger for products facing any type of export barrier (exp(β)-1). In other words, illegal exports may amount to as much as 50% of legal exports. For export taxes the trade gap may be as much as 87% larger. Yet the biggest effect by far is found for export prohibitions; the trade gap is around 12 times larger for prohibited exports than for all other products.
Interestingly, I do not find a significant effect for export license requirements. This may suggest that this type of export barrier is most adequate in avoiding illegal exports. Another explanation is that the illegal activity is displaced from border circumvention to license acquisition. In this case illegal exports would not appear in the trade gap but rather in a illegal licenses.
In robustness checks I take into account zero trade flows by taking inverse hyperbolic sine rather than logs as the former are defined at zero (see Rotunno et al. (2013) for more on this method). The results in Table 3 (Table 4) . Furthermore, I find the usual tariff-evasion results where more imports are missing when tariffs are high, when measuring trade in dollars.
I also examine the role of corruption in illegal export. The idea here is that in the presence of corruption it should be even more likely for exporters to evade barriers, for example by paying bribes. Dutt and Traca (2010) showed that when tariffs are high, corruption greases the wheels of commerce, i.e. make it more likely for tariffs to be avoided. Similarly, Fisman and Wei (2009) showed that banned antique exports were more likely to be missing from corrupt countries. More generally, Berger and Nitsch (2008) showed that missing imports were correlated with measures of corruption around the world. An example comes from
The Economist (2014) which describes a massive scam in India where a mafia made profits of about $2 billion shipping illegal iron ore to China. The bank details found on computers taken into custody created a trail of 70 families who had bribed officials and politicians to make the exports possible. Hence, if the correlation between missing exports and export barriers indeed captures illegal exports, it should be even higher in countries where circumvention of barriers via bribes is widespread. One way to test for this is to look at how the missing exports-export barrier relationship varies across countries with different levels of corruption.
In Table 5 I show results of regressions where the export-barrier dummy is interacted with corruption in the exporting country (using the 2-year average negative of the World
Governance Indicator for control-of-corruption). I find a positive and significant interaction of corruption with export barriers and prohibitions. These suggest that missing exports are higher for product facing such barriers and even more so in corrupt countries. I still find no effect of export licenses on missing exports, no matter the level of corruption.
And while the interaction of corruption and export taxes is insignificant, the relationship between corruption and the effect of export taxes is similar to that of the other barriers. This is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows that missing exports of taxed products are only significantly higher when corruption is above the world average. This thus provides further evidence that the relationship between export barriers and missing exports captures illegal behavior.
This result is robust to another measure of corruption, namely the "Irregular payments in exports and imports" measure from the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey 2010, which asks experts: In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with imports and exports? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs). The results in Table 6 and Figure 5 confirm that missing exports are significantly higher for products facing a barrier but only in countries experts' perceive as suffering from common bribing at customs.
To investigate further how the missing export-export barrier relationship varies across countries, I also estimate the barrier semi-elasticity of missing export values by country. I estimate the following model country by country:
Results in Figure 6 indicate that Nigeria, Kenya, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, and Jamaica may have the highest level of illegal behavior. The ranking of countries confirms that corruption is linked to illegal exports. Nigeria in particular appears as an outlier with a semi-elasticity of missing exports as high as 8.5.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the illegal avoidance of export barriers on natural resources is alive and well and that corruption plays a role. This suggests that if the trade is to be controlled for environmental reasons, more effort needs to be put in tackling corruption, which allow for barrier circumvention. More research is also needed to understand how trade policies can be better designed to minimize illegal avoidance in the presence of corruption in the exporting country. One possibility is for the importing country to ban imports of illegal exports.
One such example is the US Lacey Act of 1900, amended in 2008 to make it unlawful to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any plant in violation of any foreign law that protects plants. 6 Similar initiatives could be extended to all natural resources which trade is restricted for environmental reasons.
6 The Lacey Act was invoked in a 2009 raid on Gibson which was using hardwoods that had been illegally exported from Madagascar for its guitar manufacturing. Note: All regression include country-industry-year fixed effects. Product-clustered s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bribe index is a measure of irregular payments in exports and imports from a survey by the World Economic Forum asking experts: "In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with imports and exports? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs). Note: Thick dashed lines give 95% confidence interval. Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of bribe index. bribe index is is a measure of irregular payments in exports and imports from a survey by the World Economic Forum asking experts: "In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with imports and exports? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs). These figures are based on regressions in Table 6. NGA  KEN  BOL  KAZ  JAM  GHA  EGY  TZA  ZMB  TTO  PAK  RWA  TUN  VNM  ZWE  THA  BLR  MYS  FJI  CHN  RUS  SYR  AZE  LKA  ARG  COL  MUS  IDN  IND  UGA  GMB  NAM  BRA  PRY  CAN  URY  ZAF  SEN  DZA  JPN  MLI  GUY  DOM   −13 −9 −5 −1 3 7 11 Semi−elasticity of missing exports
